The Relational Properties Approach to a Theory of Interpretation :: Gadamer Philosophy Philosophical Essays

The Relational Properties Approach to a Theory of Interpretation rear This musical theme reexamines the central thesis of Gadamers theory of rendition that intentionivity is non a suitable apotheosis for understanding a text, historical unconstipatedt or cultural phenomenon because at that place exists no one countervail interpretation of such phenomena. Because Gadamer fails to make get through the reasonableness for this claim, I bust three possible public debates. The first, predominant in the secondary literature, is built on the premise that we can non surpass our historically set prejudgments. I contemn this end as insufficient. I also reject a second lineage concerning the heuristics of understanding. I then articulate a third affirmation that the object of understanding changes according to the conditions under which it is grasped. I appeal to the notion of relative properties to make sense of this claim and to map it against devil objections (i) that it conflates meaning and logical implication and (ii) that it is saddled with an indefensible relativism. Gadamers theory of philosophical hermeneutics amounts to a sustained argument for a view that one baron call anti-objectivism or interpretive pluralism. (1) This view holds that in understanding a text, historical event, cultural phenomenon or perhaps eitherthing at all, objectivity is not a suitable perfect because there does not exist any one correct interpretation of the phenomenon under investigation. In Gadamers words, understanding is not merely a re originative entirely always a productive fermentivity as well up (G 280 E 296) it is a fusion of horizons of the onetime(prenominal) and present, objective and subjective (G 289 E 306). At the same time, Gadamer wants to steer illuminate of an anything-goes relativism. In other words, in Gadamers view, understanding is a process that invites and even demands a plurality of interpretations, but not at the expense of endo wment up criteria that distinguish regenerate ones from wrong ones. What exactly are Gadamers grounds for denying the existence of a unambiguously correct interpretation of a text, object, or event? I lead off by showing the inadequacy of two arguments for his position. I then turn to a third more lustrous argument that objectivity is not possible because the object of understanding is not determinate, but rather effected anew by each act of understanding. My goal in this paper is to provide a fuller exculpation for the third argument and thereby defend Gadamers position. I do so by reformulating this third argument in terms of relational properties so as to establish that the knowers situatedness plays, as Gadamer himself insists, a positive, constitutive role in the process of understanding.The Relational Properties Approach to a Theory of Interpretation Gadamer ism Philosophical EssaysThe Relational Properties Approach to a Theory of InterpretationABSTRACT This paper re examines the central thesis of Gadamers theory of interpretation that objectivity is not a suitable ideal for understanding a text, historical event or cultural phenomenon because there exists no one correct interpretation of such phenomena. Because Gadamer fails to make clear the grounds for this claim, I consider three possible arguments. The first, predominant in the secondary literature, is built on the premise that we cannot surpass our historically situated prejudgments. I reject this argument as insufficient. I also reject a second argument concerning the heuristics of understanding. I then articulate a third argument that the object of understanding changes according to the conditions under which it is grasped. I appeal to the notion of relational properties to make sense of this claim and to defend it against two objections (i) that it conflates meaning and significance and (ii) that it is saddled with an indefensible relativism. Gadamers theory of philosophical hermeneutic s amounts to a sustained argument for a view that one might call anti-objectivism or interpretive pluralism. (1) This view holds that in understanding a text, historical event, cultural phenomenon or perhaps anything at all, objectivity is not a suitable ideal because there does not exist any one correct interpretation of the phenomenon under investigation. In Gadamers words, understanding is not merely a procreative but always a productive activity as well (G 280 E 296) it is a fusion of horizons of the past and present, objective and subjective (G 289 E 306). At the same time, Gadamer wants to steer clear of an anything-goes relativism. In other words, in Gadamers view, understanding is a process that invites and even demands a plurality of interpretations, but not at the expense of giving up criteria that distinguish right ones from wrong ones. What exactly are Gadamers grounds for denying the existence of a uniquely correct interpretation of a text, object, or event? I begin by showing the inadequacy of two arguments for his position. I then turn to a third more promising argument that objectivity is not possible because the object of understanding is not determinate, but rather constituted anew by each act of understanding. My goal in this paper is to provide a fuller justification for the third argument and thereby defend Gadamers position. I do so by reformulating this third argument in terms of relational properties so as to establish that the knowers situatedness plays, as Gadamer himself insists, a positive, constitutive role in the process of understanding.